In the middle of the last century, Australia’s closest ally was New Zealand and its bitterest enemy was Japan.
In the early decades of the new century, those roles haven’t been entirely reversed, but they certainly have been severely shaken. Indeed, within a decade of the end of the War, Australia re-established ties with what had been its most hated enemy. Today, Japan is Australia’s second-biggest trading partner, and Australia is the most pro-Japanese nation in the world. The Quad informal alliance is only cementing that relationship further.
On the other hand, while the historic sibling Australia-New Zealand relationship remains one of the strongest in the world — a 2021 survey ranked New Zealand as Australians’ most-favoured country, at 87%, ahead of Japan’s 78%, and well ahead of even Britain and Canada — the Ardern government seems intent on shaking the family tree.
Certainly, in terms of defence and security, Australia’s one-time enemy is shaping up to be a better friend than our oldest ally, at least under Jacinda Ardern and Nanaia Mahuta’s clumsy sycophancy to Beijing.
For decades, Japan’s defence budget has hovered around 1 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), well below the levels of other G7 nations.
Japan has traditionally invested less in its military than even New Zealand – which currently spends around 1.5 per cent of its GDP on its defence force.
But this won’t be the case for much longer.
Under a new security blueprint unveiled by Fumio Kishida’s government in mid-December, Tokyo is pledging to double its defence spending to at least 2 per cent of GDP by 2027.
Since WWII, Japan has outsourced its security to the US: a bargain for both nations. Japan’s fearsome militarism has slowly been supplanted to become one of the most pacifist nations in the world, and at the same time, the nation was able to build its economic miracle largely unburdened by the cost of defence.
The danger across the Tasman is that the Ardern government seems determined to outsource its economy to China and let its defence forces simply atrophy to pointlessness.
Japan is, perforce, clear-eyed about the threat of an increasingly belligerent China. Ardern’s New Zealand is dangerously naive.
Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) openly calls out China, describing Beijing a ‘matter of serious concern for Japan’ and the ‘greatest strategic challenge’ to the country’s security.
The NSS also alleges China is developing its ‘strategic ties’ with Russia and is seeking to ‘challenge the international order’.
Jacinda Ardern, meanwhile, has all but formally signed New Zealand up to China’s notorious Belt and Road Initiative.
Tokyo’s dramatic shifts are likely to have ramifications for New Zealand, which receives a special mention in the companion National Defence Strategy that was also released in December.
The new security documents make clear that Japan expects its own changes will come as part of a team effort by ‘like-minded countries’ […]
New Zealand’s strengths in the Pacific are an obvious attraction to Japan as part of the strategy to contain China. The official said Japan was still ‘shocked’ by Beijing’s security deal with Solomon Islands that was signed early in 2022, calling it a ‘big wake-up call’ that reinforced the need for Tokyo to win ‘hearts and minds’ in Pacific countries.
The question, then, is which team Ardern and Mahuta are kicking for.
To be fair, a 2021 review of defence policy called China’s rise the ‘major driver of geopolitical change’ and said Beijing was ‘seeking to reshape the international system’. But how does that square with Ardern’s clear relish for BRI money? While Japan is, like too many countries, heavily economically dependent on China, New Zealand is even more so. But Japan is seeking to, however incrementally, diversify its trade relations; New Zealand is being pulled ever closer to the Chinese centre of gravity.
Is there a third option for New Zealand to avoid heavily aligning itself with one side or the other in the current bout of Great Power competition – and instead play the role of an intermediary between the two camps?
Noting the loss of Sweden and Finland as neutral countries in 2022, the academic said there was certainly ‘value’ in the idea of New Zealand playing the role of go-between – but it would take ‘strong and clever leadership’ to pull it off.
The Australian
And therein lies the rub.
Even factoring in a possible change of New Zealand government at the next election, should anyone have much more faith in a Christopher Luxon National government than the Ardern Labour one?