Gollyocracy: Part Two

In Part 1 of Gollyocracy published in Insight last week, I covered the first of a list of proposed electoral reforms contained in Golriz Ghahraman’s Electoral (Strengthening Democracy) Amendment Bill. Those were the proposal to reduce the voting age from 18 to 16 and reform the Maori Option process to allow voters of Maori descent to switch between the General and Maori rolls at any time, instead of the current five-yearly post-census and subsequent Maori Option exercises.

In Part 2 of Gollyocracy this week, I’ll review the other five proposed reforms: 

1. Removing the requirement for NZ citizens living overseas to have visited New Zealand within the last three years to maintain their voting rights.
2. Giving all people in prison the right to vote.
3. Implementing the Electoral Commission’s 2012 MMP Review recommendations.
4. Strengthening transparency and safeguards on donations to parties and candidates.
5. Extending the reserve provisions to include all provisions that reduce eligibility to register as an elector or to vote at an election. 

Finally, as the goal of this bill is to strengthen democracy, I’ll put the proposed reforms to the test using The Economist Group’s annual Democracy Index to determine whether they are as pro-democracy as Ghahraman claims, assuming such a thing is actually desirable.

Currently, a New Zealander must return to the country within the previous three years to maintain their eligibility to vote in New Zealand local and general elections. Under the current law, as I was last in New Zealand in April 2021 and lived in Meadowbank, I am eligible to vote in this year’s local body elections for the local board and ward of Orakei, the Auckland District Health Board and the Auckland mayoralty. In the 2023 general election, I will be eligible to vote in the Tamaki electorate as well as casting a party vote.

Under Gollyocracy, the requirement that a New Zealand citizen must have entered New Zealand in the previous three years (Section 80(1)(a)) is simply deleted, while section 72 (8) also removes any reference to the deleted Section 80(1)(a). Therefore a New Zealand citizen who is outside New Zealand shall be deemed to reside where he or she had his or her last home in New Zealand, presumably for the rest of their natural lives, because the clause stipulating a New Zealander must have entered New Zealand within the previous three years doesn’t have the period of time extended, simply deleted. If we compare this to the rest of the world, New Zealand’s removal of the three-year threshold for voting eligibility is not a radical idea. Other countries with no restrictions on expat citizens voting include:

• Sweden and Austria, though expats wishing to vote must register on a foreign residential roll every 10 years
• France, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey all have no limit on the time expat citizens can continue to cast votes in their home country
• The United Kingdom abolished its 15-year requirement in 2022
• The United States allows all US citizens who have lived in the country to vote in federal elections, while 36 states also have varying allowances for US citizens who have never lived in the USA to vote.

Multiple countries reserve seats in their parliaments for representation of expat citizens:

• Colombia has one MP for expat voters
• The Dominican Republic’s Chamber of Deputies has three seats for expats living in the USA and Canada, two seats for those in Latin America and the Caribbean and a further two seats for those living in Europe out of a total of 178 Deputies
• Portugal has two seats for citizens residing in Europe and a further two seats for citizens residing elsewhere, whereas Romania has four lower house and two senate seats reserved.

Other countries that are much stricter about eligibility for citizens living abroad include:

• Ireland, with a maximum of 18 months allowed to pass to retain voting eligibility
• Denmark has a maximum of two years, while Tuvalu requires citizens to reside in the country for two of the last three years.
• Israel and India have no time limits in theory, though in practice citizens may only vote within the nation’s borders
• Italy has no time limits on a citizen’s absence from the country. However, if the foreign nation they reside in does not have an Italian embassy, the citizen must travel to Italy to vote in person with the state reimbursing them for 75 per cent of their travel costs
• Australia is unusual in that you must enter the country within the last three years to vote or intend to re-enter the country within the next six years to vote. Compulsory voting doesn’t apply to Australian citizens living abroad, which would be a diplomatic nightmare to try and enforce otherwise.

My personal view is that it is illogical for a New Zealand citizen to elect a constituency representative for an electorate they may not have lived in for decades, though I see no reason why they should not be able to cast a party vote. If New Zealand did follow the practice of creating separate electorates for New Zealanders living overseas (which I doubt would occur), it would make the work of the Representation Commission very interesting. Based on the formula for determining the number of General and Maori electorates and using the South Island 16-seat quota that I covered in Gollyocracy Part 1, the estimated 750,000 New Zealanders living overseas would probably require an increase in the total number of MPs to ensure the proportionality of the voting system.

Following the review of New Zealand’s electorates using the data from the 2018 census and Maori Option, the number of South Island residents (1,047,321) divided by 16 seat South Island quota resulted in the requirement that the number of voters each electorate be within 5 per cent of 65,458. Should that be applied to New Zealanders living internationally, New Zealand’s Parliament could contain 65 general electorates, seven Maori electorates and 11 international electorates, leaving room for just 37 list MPs in the current 120 seat Parliament.

The Greens and the radical left have not had their desire for violent criminals to be eligible to vote satiated by an amendment to the Electoral Act 1993 that reinstated voting rights for those who are serving a prison sentence of less than three years. Prisoners also vote for the electorate in which they previously resided, not the one in which they are currently imprisoned. To be fair to Labour, which implemented the law change, the Supreme Court had ruled in 2019 that banning prisoners serving terms of less than three years from voting breached section 12(a) of the Bill of Rights. Ghahraman’s private member’s bill will enfranchise prisoners serving terms in excess of three years, preventive detention or life imprisonment. Additionally, prison managers will also be required to advise all inmates of their legal requirement to register on the electoral roll. To this day, no New Zealander has been prosecuted for failing to register on the electoral roll, despite the legal requirement to do so. Perhaps prisoners who fail to comply with compulsory enrolment should be the first?

The Electoral Commission reviewed MMP in 2012 and made a number of recommendations to alter the thresholds and representation of smaller parties in Parliament, which Ghahraman supports implementing in their entirety:

• Reducing the party vote threshold for representation in Parliament to four per cent
• Abolishing the one electorate seat threshold, eg winning an electorate seat while receiving less than four per cent of the party vote, would not bring in extra list MPs. All party votes cast for the party would be wasted
• Abolishing overhang seats. These are caused by parties winning more electorate seats than their party vote would otherwise entitle them to hold. In the 2008 election, the Maori Party won five Maori electorate seats, though their party vote of 2.39 per cent would otherwise only be enough to elect three MPs. As a result, there were 122 MPs in the 2008 Parliament. The Electoral Commission review instead recommended that the number of list MPs be reduced by two in order to maintain the size of Parliament at 120 seats.

Multiple reasons drove the public support for transitioning to MMP in the 1993 referendum and retaining it in the 2011 referendum. The representation of identity groups in proportion to their percentage of the general population was one of these drivers: a completely worthless reason for supporting an electoral system in my opinion. As the nation has become more politically correct and woke, the enthusiasm of voters for treating everyone with one particular identity feature has only grown, despite the general acceptance that racism, sexism etc. are all bad ideas. The other strong argument for MMP is the reduction of ‘wasted’ votes: those votes which don’t elect a representative. I believe that if the point of a voting system is to ensure maximal representation of voters, then minimising the wasted vote is an excellent reason for changing.

What impact would reducing the party vote threshold to four per cent, discarding the party votes of small parties that win electorate seats and effectively discarding the proportion of party votes necessary to prevent overhangs have on the wasted vote in previous MMP elections?

While we are examining these scenarios:

ELECTION	ACTUAL WASTED VOTE	WASTED VOTE IF REVIEW IMPLEMENTED
1996	7.540%	4.970%
1999	6.026%	6.561%
2002	4.871%	6.564%
2005	1.305%	8.742%
2008	6.512%	10.622%
2011	3.344%	7.486%
2014	6.212%	8.439%
2017	4.684%	5.189%
2020	7.801%	8.967%

• In 1996, the Christian Coalition would have had approximately four MPs, while the power of each party vote would have been reduced by 0.83 per cent – electing a Parliament  of 119 MPs plus Peter Dunne (whose party votes would be wasted).
• In 1999, United New Zealand’s one electorate seat would have seen them represented in Parliament but, in order to avoid an overhang, the power of each party vote would be reduced by 0.83% per cent – electing a Parliament of 119 MPs plus Peter Dunne (whose party votes would be wasted).
• In 2002, Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition would have their 1.7 per cent party vote discarded and not bring in an additional list MP. To avoid an overhang, the party vote would determine the make-up of just 119 seats plus Jim Anderton.
• In 2005, 2.12 per cent of party votes cast for the Maori Party, 1.51 per cent cast for Act and 1.16 per cent cast for Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition would be discarded. The value of each party vote was reduced by 5.81 per cent, with party votes determining the representation of just 113 MPs, plus four Maori Party, 1 Act, 1 United Future and 1 Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition MPs to avoid an overhang.
• In 2008, 3.65 per cent of the party vote cast for Act, 2.39 per cent for the Maori Party, 0.91 per cent cast for Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition and 0.87 per cent cast for United Future would be discarded. Far more votes were wasted than the 4.07 per cent cast for New Zealand First who would now be in Parliament. Again, to avoid an overhang, each party vote would be worth 6.64 per cent less, choosing just 112 MPs, plus the five Maori Party MPs and one each for Act, United Future and Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition.
• In 2011, 4.18 per cent of party votes cast for Maori Party, Act, Mana and United Future would be discarded, with the combined counted party vote electing 114 MPs plus 3 Maori Party MPs and 1 each for Act, Mana and United Future
• In the 2014 election, with the party vote determining the proportionality of 117 MPs in Parliament, I considered whether the 3.97 per cent cast for the Conservative Party may now constitute more than four per cent of party votes counted, but a four per cent threshold doesn’t work that way. The Conservatives’ 95,598 votes would still be wasted, in addition to the 53,824 cast for Act, Maori Party and United Future with 117 MPs being elected according to the party vote plus the three single MP parties.
• In 2017, only Act’s 0.5 per cent party vote would be discarded but reducing the quotient for each seat in proportion to the party vote for 119 seats would have made no difference to the makeup of Parliament.
• In 2020, only the Maori Party’s 1.2 per cent of the party vote would have been additionally discarded, with the extra list seat probably going to the Greens.

What I have demonstrated, by comparing the level of wasted vote in past elections to what it would be if the Electoral Commission Review recommendations of reducing the five per cent threshold to four per cent, abolishing the electorate seat coat-tailing rule and abolishing overhang seats for those parties which win more electorate seats that their party vote would allocate, is that’ with the exception of the 1996 election, the percentage of wasted votes would be higher were this review to be implemented. Even the 2008 election, which is the only other example of a party getting over four per cent of the party vote without winning an electorate, implementing the Electoral Commission Review would have seen more party votes discarded than under the current MMP voting rules.

Golriz Ghahraman’s private member’s bill is called the Electoral (Strengthening Democracy) Amendment Bill. It looks more like a duplicitous insurance policy for her own party, which has skated perilously close to getting less than five per cent of the party vote in 1999, 2005, 2008 and 2017, while winning just one electorate seat in 1999 and 2020. Part 6 of the Gollyocracy Bill spells out in detail precisely the rules which I have proven radically reduce representation of voters and the proportionality of representation in Parliament.

Golriz Ghahraman also wants to dictate how much of your own money you are allowed to donate, to a maximum of $35,000 per person in a calendar year, and reduce the cap on anonymous donations to $1,000. Loans may also not exceed $35,000 domestically or be made by overseas lenders. If you’re a big government, radical, air-headed poser, you probably have actually convinced yourself that you are fighting a valiant battle to keep politics pure and stop the rich from influencing government policy. Good Golly, how is it that such a logical fallacy permeates democrats on the left?

It is because they advocate for a government that is large enough, powerful enough and with sufficient finances to afford to sell favours and be bought by big donors. I said, in Part 1 of Gollyocracy, that democracy seems adequate as a voting system to keep a handbrake on career technocrats expanding the state in their own interests. It is only sufficient when the government is constitutionally limited to doing very little although I concede even the few examples of this model created centuries ago have eventually become the giant mobocracies that Golriz Ghahraman believes would work if only she were in charge.

The reality is that wealthy donors and lobbyists are not the problem. In a proper representative democracy, everyone has the right to lobby elected politicians; another feature towards which a Gollyocracy is openly hostile. The problem arises when a democratic government has unlimited favours to sell and, given the opportunity, Golriz Ghahraman will only enlarge the lolly bag.

What the Electoral (Strengthening Democracy) Amendment Bill does not mention is how political parties will fund themselves without donations over $35,000. Inevitably, the result will be greater funding by the state; in addition to the broadcasting funding allocations determined by the Representation Commission each election.

Coming to the fifth reform I mentioned at the start of this article, I’ve realised it is just dead-air-filling political-speak and is covered in my earlier objections to this bill.

The final measure of whether Golriz Ghahraman’s private member’s bill will ‘strengthen democracy’, as she claims, is to compare the democracy of New Zealand now, with the Gollyocracy New Zealand could become were this bill to be passed. The Economist Group’s Democracy Index of 2021 rated New Zealand the second most democratic country in the world with a rating of 9.37 out of 10. Each country measured is assessed against 60 criteria across five categories, of which New Zealand scored:

• Electoral process and pluralism 10.00
• Civil Liberties 9.71
• Functioning of Government 8.93
• Political Participation 9.44
• Political Culture 8.75 

For the sake of brevity, I invite you to download the 2021 Democracy Index report for free and review the detailed criteria for yourself. The appendix of methodology and criteria begin on page 65. I’ve only altered scores on criteria that I believe are directly impacted by Gollyocracy. My findings on the changes Gollyocracy will make to New Zealand democracy on the Democracy Index, if passed, are:

Electoral process and pluralism 9.58

6. Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities?

1: Yes.

0.5: Formally, yes, but in practice, opportunities are limited for some candidates.

0: No.

Gollyocracy reduces this score by 0.5 points as the restrictions on private donations to political parties will lead to public funding of political parties, entrenching the parliamentary parties with enormous financial advantages over non-parliamentary parties.

Functioning of government 8.39

Assuming all else is well, I believe these electoral reforms reinforce the absence of a system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority. I believe also that “special economic…or other powerful domestic groups exercise significant political power”, that there are no mechanisms or institutions in place for ensuring government accountability to the electorate in between elections and that Gollyocracy will worsen this problem. There are other aspects of this category I also have concerns regarding but they aren’t relevant to this bill.

Political Participation 8.89

There are serious flaws in the manner in which some ‘special groups’ participate in the political process which will be exacerbated by this bill.

Political Culture 8.75

The degree of popular support for democracy may be impacted but I suspect the blame would be targeted correctly upon the electoral system reforms rather than democracy itself.

Civil Liberties 9.38

Reviewing the measure of civil liberties provided in the Democracy Index, I would actually give a rating much closer to 7.35 but the bill itself only impacts discrimination based on race.

Final Score based only on the relevant aspects of the Bill: 9.00

Green MP Golriz Ghahraman’s Electoral (Strengthening Democracy) Amendment Bill does anything but that in most cases.

• Reducing the voting age to include people who can’t legally make decisions about their own lives without their parents’ consent, largely don’t pay taxes and may not have even completed NCEA Level 1, in any of the electoral issues they are being asked to consider will only fuel an immature idiocracy.
• Allowing one particular racial group to switch electorates whenever they please, regardless of the quinquennial process run by the Electoral Commission to ensure balanced and proportional representation in electorates, will make the Maori seats increasingly farcical, though that could discredit them to the degree that they’re eventually scrapped.
• Giving murderers, child molesters, thieves and violent gang thugs the right to vote while they’re locked in prison to keep the rest of us safe is as beneficial to democracy as lying about defending war criminals without pay is to justice.
• One evening’s analysis of each MMP election result against the recommendations of the Electoral Commission’s MMP Review of 2012 demonstrates overwhelmingly that implementation of any of those changes will devastate our system of proportional representation and, in some cases, increase the volume of wasted party votes by 400 per cent.
• Placing limits on the size of political donations entrenches established political parties who will then vote themselves access to millions of dollars of taxpayer funding while locking out new parties.
• The private member’s bill that claims it will strengthen democracy doesn’t even pass the sniff test against an international Democracy Index that has a seriously flawed view of freedom and democracy.

Golly G’s stupid bill won’t pass, but the government is looking at aspects of electoral law that are included in this bill, so we cannot afford to just write it off as Barbie of Arabia’s new Dreamhouse and Fashion Boutique Playset.