Dr Bryce Edwards
democracyproject.nz
Dr Bryce Edwards is Political Analyst in Residence at Victoria University of Wellington. He is the director of the Democracy Project.
June 2, 2021
Todayās Herald editorial isnāt buying all the forced bonhomie, instead lampooning how the rather contrived patching up of differences, including the press conference in which the big issue of China was constantly discussed without the countryās name being uttered ā see: Editorial: Friends reunion for Five Eyes? (paywalled).
Hereās the newspaperās conclusion:
āLike the actors from the wildly popular TV show, we are bound to be friends for life. But, despite this weekās staged-for-photo hongi and sports jumper trading, the friendship appears as strained as it has ever been.ā
Note, however, not everyone was so critically-minded about what happened in Queenstown ā todayās Otago Daily Times salutes the visit as a great triumph, arguing that āwe should not be too cynicalā about the contrived friendliness and displays of unity, saying āit was impossible not to feel just a little warm inside about the resumption of Anzac relationsā ā see: That old Anzac spirit.
So, did Ardern capitulate to Morrison over China? Thereās some sense of this in Richard Harmanās account of what happened in Queenstown:
āWhat was evident both in the communique issued at the end of the pairās talks and in their joint media conference was that New Zealand is now inching closer to Australiaās position on China. We are not there yet, but it would seem we are on our wayā
ā see: Together ā only slightly apart (paywalled).
According to Harman, the joint statement to come out of Queenstown was much more in line with Australiaās orientation to China than New Zealandās.
Despite Morrisonās friendly behaviour to Ardern this week, according to Harman, this shouldnāt disguise the fact that ultimately heās much more concerned with staying on side with the US:
āNew Zealand may be family to Australia ā as Morrison continually says ā but its best mate is the United States.ā
Audrey Young also points out that the āleadersā joint statement is more direct [about China] this yearā, and that āNew Zealand has become more critical of China, not lessā ā see: Why Scott Morrison revived the Anzus alliance after talks with Ardern (paywalled). And she argues that Morrisonās friendly line towards New Zealand was entirely strategic:
āHe knows that any sense of public disagreement on China will please only China and as a regional leader, it is in his interests to present a unified position with New Zealand.ā
Young suggests that there was in fact a heavy message given to New Zealand in Queenstown:
āThe fact that Scott Morrison deliberately alluded to the Anzus alliance with New Zealand twice is a departure from the usual invocations of the Anzac spirit. Analysts will be poring over his statements, especially in light of Australian Defence Minister Peter Duttonās public musings about armed conflict. These things are not said for nothing. The Anzus reference is likely a gesture on the part of Australia to remind New Zealand that it is a formal defence ally in dealing with the area known as the Indo Pacific and that requires obligations, not complete independence.ā
Stuff political editor Luke Malpass similarly argues that Australiaās continued emphasis in Queenstown on the need for a āfree and open Indo-Pacificā is telling, asserting that regional players need to push back stronger against China. And the āAnzacā rhetoric is translated:
āIn other words: both countries will seek to uphold and defend the US-led international order against Chinese assertiveness in the regionā
ā see: Jacinda Ardern and Scott Morrison: an Anzac Indo-Pacific mission accomplished.
Nonetheless, Malpass concludes that the meeting was a great success for the two leaders:
āNew Zealand and Australia are singing from the same song sheet on China. And it is a domestic political win for both leaders. Australia thinks it has pulled New Zealand back into the sceptical-about-China club. While New Zealand, which never thought it was really out, gets to reaffirm that the trans-Tasman relationship and western alliance is bigger than any current leader.ā
The response from Beijing to the Queenstown meeting can be read in Zane Smallās Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta brushes off Chinaās āpredictableā response to NZ-Australia statement on Hong Kong, Xinjiang. The key part of this is this statement of Chinaās foreign affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin:
āThe leaders of Australia and New Zealand, with irresponsible remarks on Chinaās internal affairs relating to Hong Kong and Xinjiang as well as the South China Sea issue, have made groundless accusations against China, grossly interfered in Chinaās internal affairs and seriously violated the international law and basic norms governing international relationsā.
But Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta isnāt too worried about this, and argues that Beijing wonāt really find much to be offended by what Ardern and Morrison said, because āThese joint statements are very predictable and consistent with what weāve already said.ā
Perhaps of much more interest and significance is an article published in the China state-controlled Global Times, which is highly sympathetic to New Zealandās position and actions ā see Ning Tuanhuiās Wellington continues its pragmatic policy despite Canberra pressure. The key part of this article is the following about the joint Ardern-Morrison communique:
āThe statement was more intended to show the two sidesā general unity. And by including these China-related issues in the statement, New Zealand was showing some respect and support for Australiaās feelings, instead of blindly joining an anti-China chariot.ā
Finally, just why has Australia diverged from New Zealandās pragmatic orientation towards China? Chris Trotter explains today that Australia has gone hard against China, risking disastrous trade wars and even all-out military conflict due to the rise of Christian fundamentalists to the top of their government ā see: Australiaās Eschatological diplomacy.
This article can be republished under a Creative Commons CC BY-ND 4.0 license. Attributions should include a link to the Democracy Project.