8th April 2021
The Irrawaddy spoke to Scot Marciel, who served as US ambassador to Myanmar from 2016-20, about the unfolding crisis in the country and how the international community and regional powers can help stop the regime’s violence against the Myanmar people.
Let’s discuss the Quad members, in particular Australia. Australian adviser to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Sean Turnell is now in detention. Australia has been accused of being too soft, of acting like a ‘Norway of the southern hemisphere’, or like India. It has been skittish and people are saying it’s not to be trusted. But to be fair on both countries what are your thoughts on what can they do?
Well I think it is not helpful for various countries to be complaining about other countries. The trouble is, the truth is, that this is a very difficult situation. If there was an easy answer we would have already solved the problem. And I think each country is trying to make the best decision they can. Certainly I know Australians are in a very difficult situation.
There is quite active debate in India right now about how to proceed. But again, I would just say that what’s important is to look at the best prospects for Myanmar returning to peace and stability and a legitimate government that the people of the country accept. And I think it’s clear that rule by the Tatmadaw is not the answer. And as times goes on, as more and more governments see this, I hope they will be compelled to act.
Let’s talk about Thailand, Indonesia and India, and even Bangladesh, because refugees are fleeing, activists are fleeing. There have been airstrikes targeting the Karen civilian population and insurgents along the Thai-Myanmar border. From a humanitarian point of view, how should these neighboring countries react and what can the US do to collaborate with them?
Well particularly with Thailand, it has a long history of accepting refugees fleeing conflict in the region. And we have a long history of working with Thailand as well as the UN and others to help Thailand meet the burden of hosting, hopefully temporarily, refugee populations.
Recently Bangladesh has taken a lot of refugees. We have been working with them and the UN and others too, to help share the burden of that. I think the US has been quite generous and think we will continue to be generous in trying to support what is a huge burden for any country, to take a lot of refugees. But I think, also, these countries have taken a lot of refugees in the past; they don’t love it. But they do it because it’s their responsibility and I expect they will going forward. And I think the international community, including the US, will do what it can to support them financially and otherwise as they deal with this.
The US is implementing more targeted sanctions. Do you think this will work? What more can the US do?
There was this whole debate before 2010 and after 2010: Did sanctions work? Did engagement work? I think you need multiple things by multiple countries, each country doing what it can. Sanctions that reduce the flow of money to the junta, I think can be helpful. The Biden administration for example freezing US$1 billion of reserves at the New York Federal Bank, that’s money the junta can’t use to suppress its people and maintain its hold.
I don’t think sanctions alone solve the problem. It’s an international effort not to accept or give legitimacy to the military junta that’s really important. It’s psychological but it is really important [to the junta] that they feel accepted. Because clearly their hope is that over time more and more governments will just accept them. There needs to be continued diplomatic efforts to work together to create a strong pressure on the Tatmadaw to recognize that it’s not going to win and to look for a way out. And that needs to be as many countries as possible, including the US.
It’s also important that there be continuing dialog as much as possible with the Myanmar public, whether it is with elected parliamentarians or people whom the international community is able to talk with to make sure that whatever we are doing reflects as much as possible what the people of Myanmar are asking for. I think that is critical.
Before 2010 Myanmar was opening up under President U Thein Sein. The US, whether under Democrats or Republicans, was playing a leading role in Myanmar. Some critics kept saying Myanmar was a ‘boutique issue’ in Washington, but in the region and inside the country the role of the US was held in high regard. Do you think the US is doing enough or does it have too much on its plate?
I think it’s getting a lot of attention. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spoken about it multiple times. President Biden spoke about it. People are working constantly to look at what else we can do. You have seen a series of actions. But you also see on social media, people saying why don’t you do this and that. Honestly, the people may be well intentioned, but then you look at the suggestions and you realize that sometimes they are not easy to do, or it may not be very helpful.
It takes a lot of work to make sure that whatever we do is helpful. I know the US will continue to be active diplomatically working with ASEAN colleagues, Japan, India, Australia, others—whoever is interested in contributing to the solution — and at the UN. The US sees [that] this may not be resolved for some time, but it is very much on the side of the people of Myanmar. And their clear message is that they don’t want to go back to military rule. So we are going to do everything we can to support that effort, even if it takes a lot of time.
In 2016 there was controversy over the US decision to lift sanctions on Myanmar. Some people regretted the lifting of sanctions on certain individuals. Some people argued that sanctions should remain until genuine change occurred.
I supported the lifting of sanctions and I still think based on what we knew then it was the right decision. It is important to remember that the sanctions that had been put in place until Myanmar allowed fair elections. Obviously the [2015] elections were not perfect—the military still controlled 25 percent of parliament—but the pro-democracy movement (very much) obviously participated and supported those elections and took charge of the government.
The second thing was, at that point, our sanctions were hindering the kind of investments that we thought the country needed [in order] to have the economic progress that would reinforce the democratic reforms we had hoped for. You can’t say, “We need you to keep on making reforms, but we are going to make it harder for you by squeezing your economy.”
The other point I would make is there is a tendency sometimes to exaggerate the influence of sanctions. We had sanctions in the early 2000s when the Tatmadaw was brutalizing the population in Karen and Shan states. It did not stop them. I have a hard time believing that maintaining sanctions would have stopped the Tatmadaw from either its actions in Rakhine or its coup. You can’t prove it. But there is just no evidence to support that, so I think it was the right decision at that time, and I think people tend to exaggerate how much leverage sanctions give you.
When you were ambassador, you worked with government officials including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also with some top military leaders. Did you have any sense at the end of your term, any sort of signal or message or indicator, that Myanmar was returning to dark times? What was your feeling then?
Overall we certainly had some concerns about the Rakhine State situation, we had concerns about the lack of progress on peace, and we had concerns about things like freedom of press and assembly that were not at the level that we certainly had expected. And we certainly had concerns about the military’s behaviour, which was bad even then. I didn’t anticipate a coup, no I didn’t. And so, I remained, when I left, optimistic, but optimistic in the longer term, because I saw a whole new generation of people rising, better educated, more access to information, more open minded and I thought that was the great hope for Myanmar, and I still think that’s the great hope.
And you see these young people now very active and even talking among themselves about the need to change the relationship between the different ethnic groups and these sorts of things. I think that’s still great reason for optimism in the long run. But no, in short, I did not anticipate the coup and I am really sad to see this crisis.
Source the Irrawaddy 8th April 2021
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